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FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION: HOW MANY PEAKS
FOR THE EURO AREA?
Giorgio Di Giorgio∗
Carmine Di Noia∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION

F

inancial markets have developed significantly throughout
industrialized countries in the last decades of the twentieth century. This path is evident with regard to banking
and financial intermediaries, capital markets, and financial
instruments. Accordingly, many European nations have either
modified their financial systems — regulatory and supervisory
— to reflect this development1 or are currently debating
whether to implement such modifications.2 In Europe, with the
start of Phase III of the European Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”), the responsibility for monetary policy in the euro
area has been assigned to the European Central Bank (“ECB”),3
while banking and financial supervisory tasks have been left to
domestic agencies.4 This development, which reflects “[t]he
abandonment of the coincidence between the area of jurisdiction
of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of banking su-
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1. As is the case most recently with Germany, Austria, Ireland, Portugal
and the Netherlands, and earlier in the Scandinavian countries and the
United Kingdom.
2. As in the case of Italy and France.
3. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision, 2 INT ’L FIN .
295, 297 (1999).
4. Id. at 269.
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pervision,” was a relative novelty in the euro area.5 This geographical and functional “double separation” between central
banking and banking supervision6, along with the absence of
any explicit reference to responsibility for financial stability in
the euro area, has cast doubts about the efficacy of the current
regulatory arrangements in preventing and managing financial
crises.7 As a consequence, both academic and institutional ve nues throughout the euro area are now discussing various proposals for financial system regulatory reforms.8
Naturally, the first decision lies between choosing either centralized or decentralized financial regulation. National level
regulation and supervision are faced with great difficulties
within the context of increasing financial markets integration
and cross-border mergers among banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies. However, the task of fully centralizing
regulatory and supervisory activities at the euro level has
prove n equally challenging, given the current differences in fiscal and commercial codes, and accounting practices across
member countries.
This work presents a proposal for the reorganization of regulatory arrangements and supervisory agencies in the EMU. It
5. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision, Lecture at
the London School of Economics Financial Markets Group (Feb. 24, 1999),
available at http://www.ecb.int/key/sp990224.htm.
6. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 297.
7. Id. at 305.
8. See K AREL LANNOO, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY S TUDIES (“CEPS”),
TASK FORCE REPORT NO . 30: CHALLENGES TO THE S TRUCTURAL S UPERVISION IN
THE EU 34 (2000); Xavier Vives, Banking Supervision in the European Monetary Union (1999), at http://www.iue.it/FinConEU/vives.pdf; EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, INTERNAL M ARKET DIRECTORA TE GENERAL, INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGULATION AND S UPERVISION OF THE FINANCIAL
S ECTOR (2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/
banks/arrange.pdf
[hereinafter
INSTITUTIONAL A RRANGEMENTS];
THE
COMMITTEE OF WISE M EN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE M EN ON
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN S ECURITIES M ARKETS (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/lamfalussyen.
pdf. [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT]; DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL , FISCAL,
AND ENTERPRISE A FFAIRS , O RGANISATION FOR E CONOMIC C O- OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), CONSOLIDATED S UPERVISION IN T HEORY AND IN
PRACTICE 8, Doc. No. DAFFE/CMF (2001) [hereinafter OECD 2001]; Stephen
A. Lumpkin, Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area, 81 FIN.
M ARKET
TRENDS
81,
81–139
(Apr.
2002),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00032000/M00032071.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2002].
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argues that with a highly integrated single currency, such as
exists in the euro financial system, maintaining only domestically-based regulatory schemes and supervisory practices is inappropriate. At the same time, as stressed in the Lamfalussy
Report, full centralization appears difficult to achieve in the
near future.9 Hence, this Article suggests a two-level architecture for financial market regulation and supervision inspired by
the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”).10
This innovative proposal’s theoretical underpinnings for euro
area financial market regulation reform, may be found within
the new literature on the theory of financial intermediation.11
This literature emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences among banking and other financial intermediaries.12
The main similarities include the provision of risk management
services to customers, and decreasing the participation costs in
ever more complex financial markets.13 Indeed, the trad itional
lines that divide financial institutions, instruments, and markets into banking, insurance, and securities sectors have become blurred in advanced industrial countries.14 Technological,
geographical, and functional integration has led to despecialization of the intermediaries and the reduction of the
“reserved activities” that previously characterized different
types of financial operators.15 The traditional tripartite division
of the financial market (i.e., the banking, insurance, and securi9. LAMFALUSSY REPORT , supra note 8, at 10.
10. The European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) is composed of the
European Central Bank (“ECB”) and the national central banks (“NCBs”) of
all fifteen EU member states. The “euro system” is the term used to refer to
the ECB and the NCBs that have adopted the euro as currency. The primary
objective of the euro system is to maintain price stability. See Organization of
the European System of Central Banks, at http://www.ecb.int/
about/escb.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
11. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Markets, Intermediaries,
and Intertemporal Smoothing, 105 J. POL. ECON . 523 (1997); Franklin Allen &
Anthony M. Santomero, Theory of Financial Intermediation, 21 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1461 (1997).
12. George S. Oldfield & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in
Financial Institutions, S LOAN M GMT. REV . 33, 36 (1997); Allen & Santomero,
supra note 11, at 1462.
13. Allen & Santomero, supra note 11, at 1462.
14. See infra Part II.
15. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ,
FINANCIAL M ARKET T RENDS NO. 81, S UPERVISION OF FINANCIAL S ERVICES IN THE
OECD AREA 82 (2002) [hereinafter OECD FINANCIAL S ERVICES].
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ties sectors) failed to consider that the creation and allocation of
savings among sectors cash surpluses and cash deficits, were
basically unitary phenomena.
The current stream of literature advocates a unitary view of
financial intermediation that requires homogeneous regulation.16 Contrary to the unitary view, the old “institutional”
model for financial market regulation and supervision should be
dismissed. In such a traditional regulatory model, supervision
is over each single category of financial operator, or over each
single segment of the financial market, and all supervisory activities are assigned to a distinct agency.17 In this institutional
model, there are three supervisory authorities acting as watchdogs over: (1) banks; (2) financial intermediaries and mutual
funds; and (3) insurance companies and their corresponding
markets, respectfully. The authorities control intermediaries
and markets through entry selection processes (e.g., authorizations and enrolling procedures in special registers), constant
monitoring of business activities (controls, inspections, and
sanctions) and decisions about exit from the market (suspensions or removal). “Institutional” regulation facilitates the effective realization of controls. Each intermediary and market
has to deal with only one, highly specialized supervisory authority. As a result, this type of regulation avoids duplication of
controls and reduces regulation costs. The institutional approach seems to be particularly effective for intermediaries specialized in only one of the three segments of the financial sector.
However, when different entities are entitled to perform identical financial intermediation activities, the institutional model
may induce distortions in the market. For example, financial
supervisors impose different rules upon entities that conduct
similar financial services whose only difference is their legal
status.18
The institutional approach’s disadvantages are exacerbated
by the trend toward multiple-sector activities and by the progressive de-specialization of intermediaries.19 In turn, these
phenomena are connected to the growing integration of finan16. OECD FINANCIAL S ERVICES, supra note 15, at 98.
17. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL ., FINANCIAL REGULATION : WHY, H OW,
WHERE NOW? 144 (1998).
18. Id. at 146–47.
19. See id. at 143.

AND
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cial markets and instruments.20 In a context where the
boundaries separating the various institutions are progressively
being erased, it is no longer possible to definitively determine
whether particular entities are banks, non-banking intermediaries, or insurance companies. Nor is it easy to determine to
what degree and extent such entities are engaged in the various
financial activities. Therefore, a risk exists that “parallel” systems of intermediaries may form, reflecting only the diversity of
the respective control authorities. In this case, the way that
institutional controls are established may actually become a
destabilizing factor. Moreover, the financial intermediaries
might be induced to organize in such a way that their juridical
status is contingent upon the different rules that discipline different institutions.
For all these reasons, the recent trend is in favor of a “level
playing field” financial regulation model, providing uniform
rules for entities that engage in similar activities. Different
models of such “transversal” regulation have been adopted recently or are currently under discussion in Europe and elsewhere. The best known solution is the Single Regulator Model,
adopted in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) in 1997, as well as in
some Nordic European countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark),
and more recently in Austria and Germany.21
This Article argues for a more general policy proposal based
on the “transversal” model — recently adopted in Australia —
which serves to shift the attention away from supervised institutions to the actual “object” of the supervision.22 It is centered
20. See Richard Dale, Regulating the New Financial Markets, in RESERVE
BANK OF AUSTRALIA, THE F UTURE OF THE FINANCIAL S YSTEM: P ROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE
(Malcolm
Edey
ed.,
1996),
available
at
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/
1996/Dale.pdf.
21. Michael Taylor & Alex Flemming, Integrated Financial Supervision:
Lessons of Scandinavian Experience, FI N. & DEV . 42, 42 (1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/12taylor.htm. See also OECD
2001, supra note 8, at 2, 10, 24 n.1.
22. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 149. See generally AUSTL . S EC. &
INV . COMM’N, A NN. REP. 1999–2000 [hereinafter ASIC ANN. REP.]; OECD 2001,
supra note 8. In Australia, the Australia Prudential Regulation Authority
(“APRA”) has identified the coordination of prudential supervision of financial
conglomerates as one of its major roles. COUNCIL OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS
ANN. REP. 2001, available at http://www.apra.gov.au/
Policy/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=4835.
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on the assignment of different regulatory objectives, or “finalities,” to different and independent authorities.23 These authorities would be competent throughout the financial system, providing homogeneous regulation and supervision regardless of
the intermediaries’ subjective nature. In the euro area, given
the previously mentioned difficulties in choosing a solution between full centralization or decentralization, this Article suggests merging these regulatory models “by objective” into a federal system organized similar to the ESCB. However, it is also
argued that the Single Regulator Model may be viewed as a
particular case of the regulatory model “by objective,” and that
the choice between specification or a more complex version depends upon some practical considerations in terms of costbenefit analysis.
In practice, the proposal advocated in this Article is the establishment of a “European System of Financial Regulators,”
with either two or three distinct independent authorities along
with the ECB at the European level, each being responsible for
one or more regulatory objectives. Such a system should characterize these agencies by homogeneous procedures governing
their creation, functioning, and funding. In turn, these agencies
will push and coordinate the work of their corresponding national authorities within each member country. Under such a
regulatory system, at both the European and domestic level, a
coordination committee would serve to resolve conflicts and controversies. For this reason, considerable effort would be needed
to ensure proper accountability of such independent authorities.
Part II begins with a description of the currently adopted
regulatory frameworks for financial markets and intermediaries in the European countries. Part III presents a proposal for a
new European architecture for financial market regulation,
evaluating the pros and cons of two possible practical and al23. The Council of Financial Regulator’s role is to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation by providing a high level forum
for cooperation and collaboration among its members including the Reserve
Bank of Australia (“RBA”), which chairs the Council, APRA, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”).
See APRA, at
http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/
The-Council-of-Financial-Regulators.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). See also
Government Online Stategy: The Australian Prudental Regulation Authority’s
Online Action Plan § 2.4, at http://www.apra.gov.au/aboutAPRA/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter APRA Online Action Plan].
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ternative solutions. Finally, Part IV presents an overview of
the issues at hand and provides policy prescriptions for the euro
area.
II. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN EUROPE:
WHERE DO WE STAND?
Economic regulation aims at correcting market imperfections
and unfair distribution of resources, while simultaneously pursuing three general objectives: stability, equitable resource distribution, and efficiency. Regulating and supervising the financial system is particularly important, especially since capital
accumulation and the allocation of financial resources are essential for growth and development.24
The first objective of financial market regulation is the pursuit of macroeconomic stability.25 Central banks fulfill this objective through macro-controls over currencies (when applicable), interest rates, payment, and (possibly) settlement systems.
They also function as lenders of last resort.
The second objective pertains to micro-stability (i.e., prudential regulation) of the intermediaries.26 Measures targeting this
goal are subdivided into two categories: general rules on the
stability of all business enterprises and entrepreneurial activities,27 and more specific rules due to the special nature of financial intermediation.28
The third objective of financial regulation is transparency of
the market and of intermediaries, i.e., investor protection.29
24. See generally GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 17; DAVID LLEWELLYN, T HE
ECONOMIC R ATIONALE FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION, FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AUTHORITY (1999), RICHARD J. HERRING & ANTHONY M. S ANTOMERO, WHAT IS
OPTIMAL FINANCIAL REGULATION? (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No.
00-34, 1999).
25. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 189.
26. Id. at 5–6, 189. See also HERRING & S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 4.
27. Such as the legally required amount of capital, borrowing limits and
integrity requirements.
28. Such as risk-based capital ratios, limits to portfolio investments and
the regulation of off-balance activities, the managing of deposit insurance
funds or investor compensation schemes.
See generally HERRING &
S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 17–19.
29. See OBJECTIVES AND P RINCIPLES OF S ECURITIES REGULATION ,
INTERNATIONAL O RGANIZATION OF S ECURITIES REGULATION § 4.2.2, at 8 (1998)
(“Transparency may be defined as the degree to which information about trading (both for pre-trade and post-trade information) is made publicly available
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This is linked to the more general objective of equitable distribution of available resources and may be viewed as the search
for “equity in the distribution of information as a precious good”
among market participants.30 At the macro-level, transparency
rules impose equal treatment (e.g., rules regarding takeovers
and public offers)31 and the correct dissemination of information
(e.g., rules prohibiting insider trading and manipulation and,
more generally, the rules dealing with exchange microstructures and price-discovery mechanisms).32 At the micro-level,
such rules aim at guaranteeing non-discrimination in the relationships among intermediaries and different customers by establishing conduct of business rules.33
The fourth objective of financial market regulation, linked
with the general objective of efficiency, is the safeguarding and
promotion of competition in the financial sector.34 This type of
regulation requires rules for controlling market power and
structures, which at the micro level involves mergers and acquisitions regulations, as well as safeguards against cartels and
abuses of dominant position. Specific controls over financial
intermediaries and markets may be also justified as an attempt
to limit destabilizing excesses generated by tough competition
in this important sector.
In order to pursue these enumerated objectives, there is neither a unique theoretical model nor a practical approach to the
regulation and supervision of financial markets. Literature on
these matters identifies significant differences in both the definitions and classifications of regulatory models and techniques.35 In reality, it is also difficult to observe the adoption of
regulatory schemes that are fully consistent with only one theoon a real-time basis.”). See also, e.g., CLIVE BRIAULT , THE RATIONALE FOR A
S INGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL S ERVICES REGULATOR, FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AUTHORITY 10 (1999). See also, HERRING & S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 9.
30. See HERRING & S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 6–8. See generally Allen
& Gale, supra note 11.
31. See HERRING & S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 7–8.
32. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 10. See also HERRING & S ANTOMERO ,
supra note 24, at 9–10.
33. See HERRING & S ANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 7–8.
34. See, Lawrence J. White, International Regulation of Securities Markets:
Competition or Harmonization?, in THE INDUSTRIAL O RGANIZATION AND
REGULATION OF THE S ECURITIES INDUSTRY 208, 219–21 (Andrew W. Lo ed.,
1996) [hereinafter White, International Regulation of Securities Markets].
35. See generally OECD 2002, supra note 8.
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retical model. A glance at the European Union’s current state
of financial market regulatory and supervisory arrangements
confirms this, making it evident that multiple regulatory
schemes often are in effect.36
In each European country, financial markets regulation has
been affected by the structure and the evolution of the domestic
financial system as well as by the legal system in place.37 In
general, national regulation first focused on banking intermediaries, given their traditional dominant role in continental
Europe’s financial sector.38 Most of the recent changes in member countries came about as a result of pressure brought on by
EC directives and from increased cross-border financial market
integration, which at first stimulated and then followed the
1992 single market program.39 However, despite EU member
countries’ implicit commitment to ensuring the adequate regulation and supervision of financial sectors, no European law
deals with the problem of how to regulate and supervise financial markets and intermediaries.40 As a consequence, the EU
currently utilizes a combination of different regulatory approaches. Moreover, many member countries also lack a “pure”
regulatory model that applies throughout the national financial
system.
The Nordic European countries (in particular, Sweden and
Denmark), the U.K., Austria, and Germany, have chosen to
delegate financial regulation and supervision to a unified

36. See infra Figure 1. See generally id.
37. See generally OECD 2002, supra note 8.
38. See, e.g., id. at 85.
39. Moreover, in many member countries no “pure” regulatory model is
adopted throughout the national financial system. Id. at 109–19.
40. Id. at 116. Sweden’s “single integrated agency” is known as Finansinspektionen, which was structurally changed into one agency in September
2000. Id. at 116. In Denmark, financial services are supervised by the Finanstilysynet, which was created in January 1988. Id. at 117. In the U.K., financial services are supervised by the Financial Services Authority, which was
created in late 2001, and is subject to the Financial Services and Markets Act
of 2000. Id. Germany consolidated its various supervisory agencies into the
Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision, or the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. Id. at 109. In April 2002, Austria also adopted
a single regulatory model. Id. at 113–14. See Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di
Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to
Different Agencies?, 3 INT’L FIN . 361, 366 (1999).
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agency, separated by the central bank.41 This regulatory approach is a coherent and integral application of the Single
Regulator Model, based on just one control authority with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries, regardless of
whether in the banking, financial or insurance sector.42 Such
regulatory authority concerns itself with all the objectives of
regulation, but in particular with microeconomic stability and
investor protection.43 Recently, Ireland commenced and France
announced projects aimed at establishing a new single regulatory agency for financial services in order to consolidate prudential supervision and investor protection across the financial sector.44
In most other EU countries, the traditional “institutional”
model seems to still be in effect for the insurance sector, in spite
of the increasing role of insurance companies as important financial intermediaries. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Finland,
a separate agency is responsible for supervision of banking activities, securities markets, and investment funds and firms,
but none exist for insurance. As a matter of fact, contracts involving life insurance and capitalization provide services that
are directly tied to investment funds, stock exchange, or other
financial indices (i.e., unit-linked or index-linked contracts). All
major financial systems should accept the financial regulation
of life insurance, since the distinctiveness of most schemes of
life insurance, compared to other financial products, has lessened considerably.45
41. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109, 116–17.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 118. Ireland’s supervisory agency will be known as the Irish
Financial Services Regulatory Authority. Id.
44. Id. at 112–15.
45. In the U.K. system, for instance, long-term life insurance contracts are
included under investments (financial instruments) as provided by the Financial Services Act 1986 (“FSA”). The recent establishment of the FSA will further reduce the distinctiveness of insurance companies by applying a common
regulation to all financial institutions. Under the U.S. system, variable annuities and variable life insurance contracts whose yield is tied to “separate
accounts,” fall under the Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54
Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (2000)), which
provides the general guidelines relative to investment activities. In the euro
area, on the contrary, insurance companies are generally excluded from the
set of rules that apply to banks and to other financial intermediaries. In most
countries, life insurance policies are not considered financial instruments and
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A specialized “institutional” supervisor is also widely in place
for the securities market. However, in countries such as Italy
and Portugal, security supervisors are only responsible for investor protection, since the central bank assumes the role of
safeguarding stability objectives. In this case, the regulatory
model by objective applies in part. Another partial application
of this model is found in recent Dutch reform.46 The Netherlands established a single authority for financial market transparency and investor protection, while leaving the supervisory
responsibility for microeconomic stability, to either the central
bank, for banking and securities, or to a separate agency dedicated to insurance and pension funds.
In many EU countries, banking supervision is one of the
functions of the national central bank. However, in some countries, such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, and to an extent
France, this task is assigned to a separate agency, or is performed jointly by the National Bank and another agency.47 In
fact, there is a long debate among monetary economists on
whether banking supervision and monetary policy responsibilities should be vested in the same institution, namely — the central bank.48 Although no consensus among the scholars has
been reached, there is a general preference towards separating
the two functions.49 The euro area currently overcomes this
insurance companies are not authorised to perform investment services. Although there is an increasing tendency to recognise the high degree of contiguity between certain insurance products and other financial products, the
regulatory differences remain significant and insurance companies are supervised and controlled by a specialized supervisory authority with the exception
of Austria and Ireland, where responsibility is given to a government department. In Austria, the government is directly responsible for regulating and
supervising the entire financial system, although a recent proposal aims at
introducing a separate and dedicated independent agency along the lines of
the FSA.
46. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109–19.
47. VIVES , supra note 8. See also, e.g., OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109–19
(reporting on the banking supervisions of EU members including Belgium,
Luxembourg, Finland, and France).
48. See also RICHARD K. ABRAMS & M ICHAEL T AYLOR, ISSUES IN THE
UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL S ECTOR S UPERVISION 19–21 (IMF, Working Paper,
2000); Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, 51 GIORNALE DEGLI ECONOMISTI E
ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 339–58 (1993).
49. Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 48, at 337; Di Noia & Di Giorgio,
supra note 40, at 362–63.
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problem, ho wever, because the national central banks, even
when acting as financial supervisors, are no longer technically
in charge of monetary policy.50 Figure 1 summarizes the current structure of financial supervision in the EU.
Regionally, the process of financial integration followed quite
heterogeneous paths. With regard to the intermediaries, ownership integration has developed through an increasing number
of mergers and acquisitions and the establishment of new alliances d irected to diversify the business, either geographically or
functionally. Even though the process is still characterized by a
dominant share of domestic deals, cross-border operations have
recently become more important and are likely to develop further in the near future.51 Currently, traditional banking’s
prominent role in continental Europe is being challenged by
advances in information and delivery technology, and by the
entry of new and aggressive financial industry players.52 While
information and delivery technology advances have the effect of
lowering barriers to entry in banking and finance, the appearance of aggressive new financial players contributes to the erosion of the traditional banks’ monopoly, and comparative advantages in information gathering, monitoring, delivery capacity and processing.53 In fact, European financial market libe ralization also started a deep process of business restructuring
across the entire financial sector. The search for economies of
scale led to a reduced number of banks, insurance, and financial
firms which in turn lead to a considerable increase in market
concentration. For these reasons, financial conglomerates
gradually become more important, tending to act more and
more on an international basis — both at a European and
global level.
Considerable integration has taken place between the banking, insurance, and securities markets.54 In most EU countries,
banks and insurance companies are among the most important
issuers of stocks and other securities traded in both organized
50. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 297.
51. Alberto Cybo-Ottone et al., Recent Development in the Structure of
Securities Markets, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON P APERS ON FINANCIAL S ERVICE S
223, 234, 238 (R. Litan & A. Santomero eds., 2000).
52. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 299.
53. Id. See also L ANNOO , supra note 8, at 5.
54. Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 48, at 336.
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exchanges and over-the-counter. Financial products and instruments have also experienced a certain degree of integration,
sometimes changing their original economic function.55 In general, financial products have become increasingly complex, calling for new and enhanced skills in regulatory and supervisory
activities. Furthermore, the EMU increased the level of substitutability between national government and corporate bonds
because differences in interest rates across member countries
vanished. The euro is also impacting the demand side of the
stock exchanges’ business by making them quasi-perfect substitutes. For example, even though the most important exchange
in Europe, the London Stock Exchange, belongs to a non-euro
country, a sufficient number of regulatory and fiscal differences
between EMU countries still exist.56
The adoption of the single currency will speed up a naturally
ongoing process of market integration towards financial conglomeration in Europe.57 Supervising organizations are not ne cessarily a minor challenge for regulators. If it is true that risk
diversification might be within reach, the possibility of
excessive risk concentration also exists, especially when a
dome stic-based regulator looses control over the many
internationally linked activities of the supervised entities.58
Risks at group level do not always coincide with the sum of
individual risks. Moreover, larger balances may allow for more
creative accounting.
There is no point in having a common monetary policy and
aiming at an integrated financial system in the euro area while
keeping different financial regulations and supervising rules in
each member country. As a matter of fact, these national insti55. ALESSANDRO P RATI & G ARRY J. S CHINASI, FINANCIAL S TABILITY IN
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND M ONETARY UNION 59–66 (Princeton Studies in Int’l
Fin., No. 86, 1999). Cf. L AWRENCE J. WHITE , TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ,
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: T HE CHALLENGES FOR
PUBLIC POLICY 31–33 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 97-33,
1997), at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/p9733.htm [hereinafter
WHITE , TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ] (noting the change of financial products and
instruments in the U.S.).
56. See generally Roberta Karmel, The Case for a European Securities
Commission, 38 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 9, 33, 42 (1999).
57. See generally V IVES , supra note 8, at 6–8, 20.
58. Franco Bruni & Christian de Boissieu, Lending of Last Resort and Systemic Stability in the Eurozone, SUERF Studies 41 (2000).
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tutional differences serve as barriers to further financial integration and may very well prove to be an impeding factor toward a smooth transition to the EU’s single monetary policy.59
In the field of financial regulation, the principle of minimum
harmonization and mutual recognition, which originally was
thought to be able to naturally induce a convergence of regulatory behavior and more uniform rules over time, did not work.
Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area
will not even generate the more efficient outcome. On one side,
an incentive exists to promote less demanding domestic financial regulations and supervision in order to let each country become more attractive on their own for running financial business.60 On the other side, it is not clear who will pay the costs of
potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior
and financial misconduct in a member country.61 Finally, with
increasing international banking activities and a European
real-time gross settlement system in place (e.g., the TransEuropean Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Transfer System (“TARGET”)),62 the argument that domestic regulators and
supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more efficient control is becoming less persuasive.63
Another important point is that no clear tool of responsibility
for countering and/or managing the risk of financial instability
and crisis has been established in Europe.64 The EC Treaty is
silent on this topic.65 It is not even evident that the ECB will
perform the role of lender of last resort, 66 which would be desirable because the ECB functionally acts as a central bank. In
fact, only in the case of a wide-spread liquidity crisis affecting
the whole euro area, would the ECB likely assume such a role.67
59. VIVES , supra note 8, at 19.
60. Id. at 5.
61. See infra notes 75–77.
62. TARGET is the payment system of the ESCB. See V IVES, supra note 8,
at 9.
63. See Prati & Schinasi, supra note 55, at 44.
64. See Bruni & de Boissieu, supra note 58, at 41, 43, 45.
65. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , Nov. 10, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) art. 105; Di Noia & Di Giorio, supra note 40, at 363 n.4;
VIVES , supra note 8, at 9, 21.
66. See Bruni & de Boissieu, supra note 58, at 41.
67. See V IVES supra note 8, at 18 (discussing the ECBs possible involvement).
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But it is unclear what would follow a liquidity crisis located in a
single member country, or a general solvency crisis.68
For these reasons, the EMU needs a higher degree of coordination in the field of financial regulation and prudential supervision. Both regulation and supervision require further harmonization as financial market integration evolves.69 Such
harmonization attempts are currently observable among mergers and acquisitions of stock exchanges.70 Moreover, Internet
development fosters distribution channels for financial services
that will render the physical location of the financial firms irrelevant, and will pose additional regulatory problems. In addition, there continues to be a trend towards increasing crossborder mergers among intermediaries, groups, and conglomerates, as well as the dual and cross-border offerings and listings
of securities.71 However, harmonization does not necessarily
mean complete centralization. If it is too late to continue with
different national regulators and supervisors, it is probably too
early for having one or more central regulator(s) and supervisor(s) for the entire euro area. Indeed, not only is the euro area
too large, but too many different rules still exist72 and fiscal
68. Suppose we face a situation in which a single financial institution located in a member country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is
currently allowed? One of the typical forms of public intervention seems lost,
and probably the most natural, that of central bank last resort loans. See
GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 353; Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last
Resort: A Review of the Literature, 7 FIN. S TABILITY REV . 151, 154–57 (1999),
available at, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/fsr/fsr07art6.pdf. The ECB will
not intervene in favor of a single institution, especially if its financial links are
mostly domestic, because it could always assign some of the responsibility for
the crisis to the domestic financial regulator-supervisor. The domestic central
bank can not intervene by providing funds without an explicit authorization
by the ECB. In this case, it will have to convince the latter that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the old Bagehot’s doctrine, and/or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the
crisis is high. This requires time and resources. The other two traditional
instruments, bail out through a safety net provided by the banking system or
through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden on the shoulders of domestic taxpayers.
69. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 300. See Dale, supra note 20. But cf.
WHITE , TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE , supra note 55, at 28.
70. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 51, at 239.
71. Id. at 238.
72. For example, rules for commercial codes, company laws, failure procedures, corporate governance, etc.
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policies have yet to be harmonized. In addition, national enforcement might still be desirable in most cases. Thus, the only
feasible solution is the federal approach to financial regulation
and supervision, which could be organized with a structure
similar to the one established for monetary policy with the
ESCB. The next section examines the regulatory model best
suited for the entire euro area, and suggests two feasible institutional architectures to implement such a plan.
III. REGULATION “BY OBJECTIVE” IN THE EURO AREA
The selection of a feasible regulatory model for the entire
euro area presents formidable challenges. To begin, the old “institutional” model could be considered a good candidate, but
only in a context with rigidly separated financial segments, and
where no global players are at stake. But this scenario does not
apply to the euro area where a high degree of integration in financial markets and intermediaries as well as multifunctional
groups and conglomerates are rapidly growing.73 Discounting
the institutional model, the choice is narrowed down to one of
the transversal models — the “by objective”74 approach and the
Single Regulator Model75
73. See generally L ANNOO , supra note 8.
74. LLEWELLYN, supra note 24, at 8, 9.
75. A third “transversal” model is the termed “functional supervision,” or
supervision “by activity.” Although never fully applied in practice, this approach assumes the economic functions performed in the financial system, but
does not postulate that existing institutions must necessarily continue to exist
as such, in terms of both their structure and role. The financial system is
considered to perform some basic functions, including: provision of clearing
and settlement services; resource pooling; portfolio diversification; provisioning of ways of transferring economic resources through time, across borders,
and among industries; risk management services; price information discovery;
and reduction of informational asymmetries. These “functions” or activities,
undertaken by financial markets and intermediaries, are considered to be
more stable than the institutions currently performing them. Robert Merton
& Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL S YSTEM: A F UNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 12–16
(Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995).
In the “functional supervisory” model, each of these activities should be regulated by a given authority independently of the operator who offers it. Hence,
also this approach has the important advantage that it calls for the same
rules to be applied to intermediaries who perform the same activities. Moreover, it fosters economies of specialization within the supervisory authorities
and might represent a rather attractive solution for the regulation of inte-
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The single regulator solution ai ms at reaching a more efficient organization of supervisory activities, including a reduction in the costs of regulating itself.76 The advantages of this
approach lie in the economies of scale that it produces — fixed
costs, logistical expenses, the administrative personnel costs,
and executive management compensation costs are all considerably reduced.77 Moreover, this regulatory scheme calls for a
unified view which is particularly useful and effective with respect to multifunctional groups and conglomerates. By the
same token, the costs of supervision charged to those regulated
and/or to taxpayers decrease, and there is less room for “regulatory arbitrage.”78 In addition, it is considered useful to have
just one agency accountable to the market and to legislative
oversight.79 However, the validity of this model strongly depends on its internal organization: if the numerous areas of
competence and specialization are not well-structured and coordinated, the decision-making process risks slowing down.
James Q. Wilson in his seminal work on bureaucracy noted that
what counts is a clear definition of an agency’s “mission.”80
Moreover, the presence of a sole regulator might foment and
accelerate collusive relations between the regulator and the
regulated (i.e., “regulatory capture.”)81 Finally, this model
might exacerbate problems of self-contradiction in the event
that the autho rity should find itself forced to pursue conflicting
supervisory objectives.82 However, an internal organization divided “by objectives” might partially surmount this problem,
grated, advanced financial markets. However, it has numerous drawbacks.
In particular, this model envisions an overlapping of bodies controlling the
same subject: there is the risk of an excessive division of powers and responsibilities among the regulatory agencies. A further disadvantage of the functional approach is that finally what is subject to failure is not the activity
performed, but the institution. In case of serious problems of stability, it
would be essential to guarantee protection and oversight with regard to the
institutions rather than to individual operations.
76. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 18–23.
77. Id. at 18–20.
78. Id. at 19.
79. See id. at 18.
80. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 101, 109-110 (1989). See also
ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 6.
81. See WILSON, supra note 80, at 83–84; ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48,
at 16.
82. See ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 17.
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although the fact that executive management is one of the subject-matter objectives may lead to the creation of a prevalent
“single objective” as far as the decision-making process is concerned.83
The possible conflict of interest, or trade-off, in pursuing different objectives is of particular interest when they are assigned
to the same agency.84 Under this type of regime , the Single
Regulator Model is affected by the possible incompatibility
among different supervisory objectives.85 In the credit sector,
for instance, there exists a clear trade-off between competition
and stability, at least in the short run. The need to safeguard
stability in moments of economic and financial tension led to
the use of instruments designed to limit competition, such as
institutional barriers to market entry, or to the introduction of
legal limits to certain activities.86 In countries where banks are
still dominant national players in the financial sector, but not
efficient enough to compete cross-border (e.g., Spain, Italy,
Germany), the objective of competition is more easily sacrificed
than stability.87 The consequence is a “stable” environment in
terms of the number and identity of intermediaries. But this
stability may also be obtained by altering the free play of competition with measures that prevent exit of inefficient actors
from the market.
Potential conflict may also develop between the objectives of
stability and transparency (investor protection). Again, with
regard to the banking sector, scarce transparency in fund gathering activities, for example in the issuance of securities, might
allow the application of interest rates at below-market rates.
Such behavior could be considered functional to the strengthe ning of banking’s stability, but it would inevitably result in direct
injury to investors. The most immediate response to this important problem might be to attribute to different authorities
seperate supervision objectives by adopting the regulatory
model “by objectives” as the benchmark for advanced financial
systems.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 298.
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The supervisory model “by objectives,” or by finalities, postulates that all intermediaries and markets be subject to the control of more than one authority — each single authority then
remains responsible for each regulation objective regardless of
the legal form and functions, or activities that the intermediaries perform.88 According to this scheme, the first authority
watches over prudential regulation and micro-stability of both
markets and all intermediaries, regardless of whether in banking, finance, or insurance. Such an agency should supervise the
stability of the entire financial market and of individual financial intermediaries by licensing authorizations, controlling professional registers, performing inspections, issuing sanctions,
and managing crises. Authorities operating under this model
should cooperate with the second authority — the Central Bank
— which is responsible for monetary policy and macro-stability,
including supervising security settlement and payment systems, clearing houses, and in monitoring the use of financial
instruments in wholesale markets.
The third authority under this model is responsible for transparency and investor protection. It should supervise disclosure
requirements, the behavior of intermediaries, and the orderly
conduct of trading in all financial intermediation activities that
banking, securities, and life insurance intermediaries perform.89
Moreover, such an authority should be assigned powers of regulating misleading advertising by financial intermediaries. Finally, it should also control macro-transparency in financial
markets, including the discipline of insider trading, takeovers,
and public offers.
A fourth authority should guarantee fair competition, and
should guard against abuses of dominant positions and limit
dangerous concentrations in banking, security, and insurance
sectors. A diagram of this “four -peak” model for financial regulation is provided in Figure 1.
Australia recently chose this form of solution, and it appears
particularly effective in a highly-integrated market context, as
well as in the presence of multifunctional operators, conglomerates, and groups operating in a variety of different business sec88. See G OODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 156–57. See also OECD 2002,
supra note 8, at 99-101.
89. Including discipline and control in the area of transparency in contracts.
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tors. The “four -peak” model’s most attractive feature is that it
provides uniform regulation for different entities engaged in
similar activities. At the same time, this model does not require
excessive proliferation of control units.
Australia’s Financial Sector Reform Act of 1999 harmonized
financial rules and supervision assignments at the Commo nwealth level.90 The Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (“ASIC”) protects investors, superannuates, depositors, and insurance policy holders.91 This agency regulates and
enforces laws that promote fairness and proper behavior within
the financial markets and exchanges as well as among financial
firms and advisors.92 The ASIC cooperates with three other
primary regulatory bodies at the Commonwealth level. For example, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(“APRA”), established in 1998, is responsible for ensuring that
financial institutions will honor their commitments.93 The
APRA currently safeguards the soundness of deposit-taking
institutions, insurance companies, and other financial firms
after having inherited the powers and duties previously held by
the Australian Central Bank and the Insurance and Superannuation Commission.94 Monetary policy and systemic stability
are assigned to the Reserve Bank of Australia, which is the
third institutional member represented in the Council of Financial Regulators, the official site that fosters coordination efforts
and resolves conflicts.95 Finally, the fourth agency, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is charged with
antitrust powers and responsibilities.96
It is too early to evaluate the success of Australia’s recent reforms. ASIC’s 1999–2000 Annual Report indicates noticeable
improvements in the speed of completing both corporate and

90. Financial Sector Reform Act, 1999 (Austl.) (repealed).
91. For more information on the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (“ASIC”), see website at www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
92. Id.
93. See also APRA Online Action Plan, supra note 23.
94. Id.
95. See generally Reserve Bank of Australia, at www.rba.gov.au/AboutThe
RBA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
96. See generally Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(“ACCC”), at www.accc.gov.au/about.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
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market investigations and in the registration of prospectuses.97
In addition, stemming from Australia’s financial reform, the
largest number ever of unqualified people were banned from
giving investment advice, and 84% of the 461 court cases challenging the ban were upheld.98 Results from an ASIC benchmarking survey also indicate improved public perception of the
effectiveness in regulating financial reporting, corporate disclosure, market integrity and law enforcement.99
In 2001, however, HIH Insurance Ltd. (“HIH”), the second
largest insurance company in Australia, collapsed.100 Mounting
criticisms of this insolvency brought the new prudential authority, APRA, under pressure.101 Nevertheless, many of the problems leading to HIH’s failure had originated during the previous regulatory scheme. In fact, the APRA publicly recognized
the weakness in the previous insurance sector regulation, under
the Insurance Act of 1973, and launched a thorough reform,
which will be implemented in the near future.102 Regardless,
the Australian Government criticized APRA for its untimely
intervention and appointed a Royal Commission to examine
case and assess responsibility.103
Compared to the “institutional” or the Single Regulator
Model, a regulatory framework organized “by objectives” obvi97. See generally ASIC ANN. REP., supra note 22.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Charles E. Boyle, Australian Insurer HIH Seeks Bankruptcy Protection
as Losses Mount, INS . J., Apr. 9, 2001, at www.insurancejournal.com/
magazines/west/2001/04/09/features/17957.htm; David Kehl, E-Brief: HIH
Insurance Group Collapse, Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library, at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/INTGUIDE/econ/hih_
insurance.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
101. Paul Cleary, APRA’s shortcomings spelt out, AUSTL . FIN. REV ., Sept. 6,
2001, at 6.
102. Id.
See also Insurance Act, 1973 (Austl.), available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (last visited Mar. 2, 2003); Press Release, No. 0256, APRA: Both the regulator and the industry have learnt from HIH (Nov.
29, 2002), available at.http://www.apra.gov.au/internetapps/Print_Media_
Page.
103. Press Conference, Transcript of the Prime Minister, The Hon. John
Howard, MP Joint Press Conference with Minister Joe Hockey (Parliament
House, Canberra, May 21, 2001), available at www.pm.gov.au/news/
interviews/2001/interview1060.htm; HIH Royal Commision, Proposed Terms
of Reference, June 18, 2001, available at www.pm.gov.au/news/media_
releases/2001/media_release1100.htm.
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ously produces a certain degree of multiple controls.104 Such
regulations may also lead to a lack of other controls, since specific assignment of responsibilities with respect to the objectives
of regulation are not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in
practice.105 Since each intermediary is subject to the control of
more than one autho rity, this regulatory model might also
prove more costly.106 For example, the intermediaries might in
fact be required to produce several reports relating to their supervision, which may often contain identical or similar information. The intermediaries may also have to justify the same action to a whole set of authorities contemporaneously, though
each for different reasons. Vice versa, a deficit of controls might
occur whenever the exact areas of responsibilities are not
clearly identifiable. Finally, in order to be effective and to avoid
the conflicts of interest, a regulatory model organized “by objectives” needs a coordination committee consisting of all the different authorities as well as the central bank.107
In practice, however, the difference between the Single Regulator Model and the one “by objectives” is not as relevant. Actually, since it is often the case that antitrust responsibilities in
the financial sector are assigned to a dedicated agency, and
since the central bank remains in charge of macroeconomic stability, the Single Regulator Model acts as a “three-peak” regulatory model “by objective,” in which the two objectives of microeconomic stability — prudential supervision and investor protection — are assigned to a unique agency.108 In this light, the
choice between one of the two alternatives has to be made
pragmatically — by comparing the likely costs deriving from
conflicts of interest among agencies simultaneously pursuing
the targets of microeconomic stability and investor protection,

104. See Consolidated Supervision in Theory & Practice, Directorate for
Financial, Fiscal, & Enterprise Affairs, Committee on Financial Markets 4
(Mar. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Consolidated Supervision]; GOODHART ET AL., supra
note 17, at 156–57; LLEWELLYN , supra note 24, at 49.
105. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 11.
106. See, e.g., id. at 6.
107. See, e.g., L ANNOO, supra note 8, at 34.
108. See Consolidated Supervision supra note 104, at 8.
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with those costs of establishing one additional agency and its
attendant bureaucracy.109
A. Financial Regulatory Proposal for the Euro Area
This Article advocates that a modification of the current regulatory structure in the euro area’s financial sector would solve
some problematic issues regarding financial stability and address the need for greater coordinated transparency and inve stor protection rules. Of course, structuring and creating such
an integrated system of rules and institutions in the EU is far
from easy; such a change will require time, resources, political
support, and widespread collaborative attitude. Nevertheless,
it is hoped that this Article will at least constructively contribute to the current discussion.
As already stressed, whether financial regulation in the euro
area should be fully centralized at the European level, or improved through more adept harmonization at the regional level
is a difficult question to answer. Many arguments support the
view of centralizing and unifying financial regulation in the
euro area.110 However, the feasibility and opportunity of a
European centralized solution is diminished by the observation
that the euro area might be too large to be controlled by one or
two central agencies. Many different rules are still in place
with respect to commercial codes, company laws, corporate go vernance schemes, failure procedures and so on. EU directives,
when they actually exist, do only establish a common floor. Different fiscal policies are still in place even with a single currency and a common monetary policy. Furthermore, the EU’s
taxation of both financial services and other items still lacks
homogeneity. In any case, some form of national enforcement is
probably still needed.
Hence, the EU should establish a European System of Financial Regulators (“ESFR”), structured similarly to the ESCB and
109. See generally Christian Hawkesby, The Institutional Structure of Financial Supervision: A Cost-Benefit Approach, 2 J. INT’L BANKING REG. 36
(2000).
110. See, e.g., WHITE , TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE , supra note 55. In particular,
an integrated supervision on markets and intermediaries would be valuable in
a scenario dominated by conglomerates and characterized by the expansion of
electronic communication networks, market manipulation and trades on the
net.

File: DI GIORGIO Base Macro.doc

486

Created on: 3/19/2003 3:33 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM

[Vol. 28:2

organized according to the “by objective” model of regulation,
which includes the single regulator solution as a particular
case. A European Central Authority (“ECA”), separated from
the ECB, should be at the system’s center for each objective of
regulation. In a first stage (lasting for, perhaps, three years),
these authorities would be able to harmonize and coordinate
financial regulation in member countries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential supervision, and set out
appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. The EU
members should sponsor the institutional changes at the domestic level necessary for these institutions to merge and reorganize the supervisory and regulatory powers within the financial sector of each member country. At the end of this process,
each country should have only one national agency responsible
for each objective of financial market regulation. Each national
agency will then participate according to the area’s general
strategies and principles of financial regulation, becoming a
member of the ESFR. These agencies will then implement the
rules and the supervisory duties agreed upon at the euro level
within their respective country.
The “four-peak” reform model calls for the establishment of
two new European agencies — one responsible for microeconomic stability (“European Financial Supervision Authority”)
and the other responsible for oversight of financial intermediaries regarding transparency in the market, investor protection,
and disclosure requirements (“European Authority for Market
Transparency”). These two central agencies should then coordinate among the different domestic agencies in each member
country. Apart from this vertical form of coordination, cooperation should be engaged horizontally, at both the EU and national levels. The coordination and resolution of eventual controversies could be provided by special commissions for the supervision of the financial system established at the European
Commission and national treasuries.111 These commissions
would serve as the breeding ground for proposals and consultations concerning financial market regulation.
Under this regulatory proposal, no member of the ESFR
should have antitrust power so as to avoid the trade-off between
111. E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL M ARKET S TRUCTURE : A LONGER V IEW,
ANNUAL REPORT FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (1987).
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competition, and stability, and transparency. Moreover, since
agencies responsible for supervising market competition currently exist at both European and national levels, it would be
wise to establish an additional independent central agency —
the EU Antitrust General Direction. This agency would then
coordinate and promote domestic antitrust agencies. In each
member state, the national antitrust agency would be able to
safeguard competition in all economic sectors. The proposed
“four -peak” model for financial regulation in the EU is schematically presented in Figure 2.
Admittedly, this Article’s proposed regulatory structure is indeed ambitious, requiring a substantial amount of coordination
among the different authorities. An additional and delicate
challenge is that of the accountability of these new and existing
independent agencies, a topic that while deserving of separate
investigation, lies beyond the scope of this Article. Another important obstacle would be the institutional and political resistance by current national agencies, who would not passively
accept the abolishment or weakening of their regulatory powers. For such reasons, the alternative solution of merging financial supervision authority and market transparency age ncies into a single regulator may provide a practical solution. A
single regulator under this model would diminish the costs of
bureaucracy and regulation, and make coordination efforts easier.112 At the same time , possible conflicts of interest in pursuing investor protection and microeconomic stability, although
present, are certainly less relevant than the conflicts of interest
between stability and efficiency.113 In a “three-peak” model, the
single European Central Authority for financial market regulation would cooperate with the ECB for the purpose of macroeconomic stability.114 The ECA would also organize and coordinate
the work of various domestic agencies, which in different countries could be either specialized “by objective”115 or could be re-

112. See generally Julian R. Franks et al., The Direct Compliance Costs of
Financial Regulation, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1547 (1997).
113. See id. at 1563–64.
114. See OECD 2001, supra note 8, at 5; OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 16, ¶
50.
115. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 15, ¶ 46, fig. 6.
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sponsible for both market transparency and stability as the Financial Services Authority is in the U.K.116
In fact, a good example of international cooperation and coordination efforts can presently be found within banking supervision of the Basle Committee, which works on a wide range of
topics, employing no formal by-laws, but which maintains a
very strong leadership.117 Furthermore, many institutional arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the financial
sector at the EU level already exist. The most important are
the Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Commi ttee,118 both possessing comitological powers.119
In contrast, securities supervision did not succeed in establishing a similar long record of international rule-making or an
EU securities committee capable of comitological powers.120 The
European supervisory system would gain both in consistency
and effectiveness if all stability-oriented rules, all transparencyoriented rules, and all competition-oriented rules, for all types
of financial institutions and markets were either issued or be tter coordinated by distinct independent agencies at the euro
level. Only recently the Financial Services Action Plan mapped
out a first set of improvements to the EU legislative framework
for securities markets.121 Meanwhile the Committee of Wise
Men on the Regulation of European Secur ities Markets released
a final report indicating a four -step approach to making im-

116. See Financial Services Authority, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
117. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 8, at 17–20.
118. Id. at 6–7, 23.
119. Comitology refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the
Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation — representatives of member states, acting through committees called “Comitology Committees,” assist the Commission’s execution of its conferred implementing
powers. See L AMFALUSSY REPORT , supra note 8, at 24.
120. See generally White, International Regulation, supra note 34, at 207;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS .
LAW. 447 (1994). See also, e.g., K AREL LANNOO, EU S ECURITIES M ARKET
REGULATION: ADAPTING TO THE NEEDS OF A S INGLE C APITAL M ARKET — REPORT
OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 34–35 (2001).
121. Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM(1999)232 final (Nov. 1999).
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provements in the EU regulation of securities markets that was
approved by the European Parliament in February 2002.122
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that financial market regulation should
be redesigned and harmonized in the euro area according to a
regulatory model “by objectives” or “finalities.” This calls for
assigning all supervisory powers and regulatory responsibilities
in financial markets and intermediaries to a limited number of
distinct and independ ent agencies, regardless of their titles as
insurance companies, banks, or investment firms. These age ncies should be in charge, respectively, of microeconomic stability, investor protection, and competition safeguards in the financial sector. They should cooperate with the central bank for
the purpose of guaranteeing macroeconomic stability and financial soundness.
Two new European financial regulation agencies should be
established in the euro area, each formally separated by the
ECB. These agencies should be responsible for the comprehe nsive coordination of both legislation and execution of regulation
in financial markets: the first ECA should be responsible for the
microeconomic stability of all intermediaries; the second for
transparency and disclosure requirements; guaranteeing competition in financial and non-financial markets is already safeguarded by having the Antitrust General Direction of the European Commission, as well as the national agencies. It would be
wise to transform the “EU Antitrust General Direction” into a
central and independent European agency. The latter and the
two newly created central agencies would be at the center of
three European Systems of Financial Regulators, each one
structured similarly and working in connection to the ESCB
122. LAMFALUSSY REPORT , supra note 8 (Adopting a broad framework principles: implementation of these principles through a new EU Securities Committee; implementation of Community law by Member States within the
framework of strengthened cooperation and networking between national
regulators; establishing a European Committee of Securities Regulators; and
urging stronger work by the EU Commission to ensure open and fair competition in the European financial markets.) See also Financial Markets: Commission Welcomes Parliament’s Agreement on Lamfalussy Proposals for Reform, Feb. 5, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/
finances/general/02-195.htm.
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thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in
member countries. This setup is essential for maintenance of
regulation and supervision at both the European and national
levels in this proposed federal regulatory system. If this “four peak” regulatory model “by objective” leads to an excess of bureaucracy and poses serious coordination problems in the euro
area, as well as in each member country, a more practical solution would call for merging the authorities responsible for microeconomic stability and for investor protection into a single
agency, following the U.K.’s FSA example. The conflict of interest ensuing in these two objectives is surely less significant
than that between stability and efficiency.
Many difficulties are obvious in this proposal. Even in case of
a consensus on the final architecture for financial market regulation, it is difficult to design and follow a feasible political and
institutional plan to build it. Changes in the Maastricht Treaty
are needed in order to establish new agencies.123 These can be
proposed only at the next intergovernmental conference and not
before 2004. Changes in the national legislation of each EU
member country are also needed, and providing a satisfactory
degree of accountability for the new agencies will be a difficult
task. Moreover, there most likely will be strong political and
institutional opposition to such reforms. To be sure, full financial market integration will require a much higher degree of
political integration in Europe.
The authors maintain that there is an observable movement
towards a financial regulatory scheme similar to the proposed
“four -peak” architecture. With regards to macrostability and
competition, there is already an incomplete federal system in
place. For investor protection and business conduct, the new
committees established in the wake of the Lamfalussy Report
have started to coordinate and guide the national securities
regulators.124 The present challenge deals with prudential supervision and microstability of all financial intermediaries.
Given the consolidated experience of the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision and the recent experiment of the ESC B
and the forum of European Securities Commissions (“CESR”), it
123. M AASTRICHT T REATY : TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
191) 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 253.
124. See generally L AMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 9. See also European
Securities Regulation: Trojan Horses, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 67–80.
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seems plausible to believe that a new framework for European
financial market regulation and supervision will emerge based
on EU-level harmonized (secondary) regulation as well as national supervision.
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TABLES AND GRAPHS
Figure 1: Current Assignment of Responsibilities for Supervision in Banking, Securities, and Insurance Markets in the EU†
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France∗
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Nethe rlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United
Kingdom

Banking
U
BS
U
BS
CB,B
U
CB
CB,U
CB∗∗
BS
CB,S
CB
CB
U
U

Securities
U
BS
U
BS
B,S
U
S
CB,U
CB, S
BS
CB,S
S
S
U
U

Insurance
U
I
U
I
I
U
G
CB,U
I
I
I,S
I
G
U
U

Key to Figure 1:
CB: Central Bank
BS:
Banking and Securities Supervisor
B:
Banking Supervisor
S:
Securities Supervisor
I:
Insurance Supervisor
G:
Government Department
U:
Single Financial Supervisor

† Sources: ECB, M ONTHLY BULLETIN (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb200004en.pdf; KAREL L ANNOO , CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN POLICY S TUDIES, CHALLENGES TO THE S TRUCTURAL S UPERVISION IN
THE EU 34 (2000).
∗ Project announced to introduce a single financial supervisor.
∗∗ In Italy the Central bank is also the authority responsible for antitrust
in the banking sector.
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Figure 2: A Four-peak Regulatory Model by “Objectives” for
the Financial Sector
Central Bank

Authority for Supervision

Authority for Transparency

Antitrust

(Macrostability
and monetary
policy)

Banks

Investment Firms and Funds

Life Insurance

Figure 3: The European System of Financial Regulation
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